DCT has been considered an attractive view by (among others) those who want to ground the objectivity of morality in the face of contentions that what makes conduct right (or wrong) depends merely on sentiment or custom. The aim of this post however is to explore a particular objection to DCT, an objection that is among the oldest and most striking. The objection was raised famously by Plato in his dialogue The Euthyphro. In this dialogue, the protagonist Socrates critically reflects on DCT's core contention that an action's rightness (or wrongness) can be accounted for simply by appeal to what God commands. Socrates asks:
Is conduct right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right?
This question takes the form of a dilemma: Either conduct is right because God commands it, or God commands it because it is right. Part of appreciating the force of Socrates' point is realizing that one cannot have it both ways.
Once the dilemma is recognized as a genuine one, though, philosophers have argued that taking either "horn" of the dilemma is problematic for a defender of Divine Command Theory. Thus, Euthyphro's Dilemma has often been discussed as motivating an objection to Divine Command Theory, and naturally, defenders of DCT have tried to maintain that DCT is compatible with an endorsement of either of the two horns of the dilemma.
At this point, we invite readers to weigh in with responses to Socrates' question, and to consider whether or why Divine Command Theory stands threatened by an endorsement of either horn of Socrates' dilemma. In Part Two of this post, we will outline some of the standard philosophical problems associated with endorsing DCT alongside either horn of Socrates' dilemma. But for now, we invite readers to engage directly with Socrates' famous question.
While I would agree with Socrates point that with this dilemma you can't have it both ways I do not agree with the view that taking either 'horn' in this dilemma is problematic for DCT, in fact, I would go as far as to say that one point of view raises some problems while the other actually supports DCT.
ReplyDeleteI am looking at this dilemma with the Cosmological argument in mind, that is that God exists as a self existent being that is the ultimate cause of all things, in my opinion, the best argument in favour of the existence of a divine being.
If God is the ultimate cause of all things then I would have difficulty in arguing against the statement that 'conduct is right because God commands it'. If you believe in such a good, divine being then it seems reasonable that all that he commands would be right. There are of course examples particularly in the Old Testament of the Bible where God issues conflicting commands but that is another issue and in principle I do not have a problem with this statement.
With the other statement, 'God commands it because it is right', I find three major problems. The first problem is that if God is the ultimate being and ultimate cause then all things and their properties come from him. If God commands something because it is right, there must be something with the property of rightness that pre-exists Gods command bringing into question his status as the ultimate being and cause. The second problem is that if God commands things that are right, this implies that God himself is bound by some greater moral code rather than being the source of all morality. The third problem I see is that while it says that God commands things that are right, it does not say that he commands ALL things that are right leaving the possibility that there may be right things which God had not commanded.
To simplify, I would suggest that this dilemma is simply a choice between whether you believe that God decides what is moral from pre-existing things or if God is the creator of all that is moral.
On the question of whether DCT is threatened by either of the views in the dilemma, the problems I have outlined above show that there is a conflict if God commands things because they are good but saying that all that God commands does seem compatible with the Cosmological argument and is not a threat to DCT.
Dear 95729, thanks for your comment. You write: "If God is the ultimate cause of all things then I would have difficulty in arguing against the statement that 'conduct is right because God commands it'. If you believe in such a good, divine being then it seems reasonable that all that he commands would be right." It seems like you are making two separate pieces of reasoning here. Let's consider them both. Firstly: "If God is the ultimate cause of all things then I would have difficulty in arguing against the statement that 'conduct is right because God commands it'. Suppose we stipulate ex hypothesi that God is (as you put it) the ultimate cause of all things. Why would it then be hard to argue against the statement "conduct is right because God commands it." Your reasoning here relies on an implicit premise like the following: That the creator of things is also thereby the creator of the moral laws against which those things are evaluable. This implicit premise certainly isn't a truism and would have to be argued for, rather than taken for granted. Now let's look at the second piece of reasoning you offer: "If you believe in such a good, divine being then it seems reasonable that all that he commands would be right." Firstly, of course nothing about whether it is reasonable that all God commands would be right follows from facts about whether one believes in a God. But reading you more charitably, it seems you think that if God exists and is good, that all he commands is right. Even if this were granted, it would be (strictly speaking) orthogonal to the claim being made in the first horn of the dilemma: the claim here is not merely that God commands what is right, but more precisely, that conduct that is right is right BECAUSE God commands it. It is this latter articulation that is specifically thought to be problematic for proponents of DCT to maintain.
ReplyDeleteHow would you address the fact that this question presupposes that the reader believes in God? If the interpretation is from the perspective of one who considers this idea of "God" to be an idealized characterization of good and just qualities and not an actual physical being, I would say that God commands it because it is right. In my opinion, the concepts of right and wrong exist outside of the framework of religion, and therefore this question might be considered outside of that framework as well.
ReplyDeleteDear McChillin, thanks for your comment. You make several claims here so I'll address each one separately. Firstly, you say:
ReplyDelete"How would you address the fact that this question presupposes that the reader believes in God?"
The question is raised in the context (by Socrates) of challenging defenders of DCT by forcing a dilemma. One who does not antecedently accept DCT is not faced with this dilemma. However, one need not endorse DCT to consider how it is that the question DOES frame a dilemma for DCT defenders.
You write further:
"If the interpretation is from the perspective of one who considers this idea of "God" to be an idealized characterization of good and just qualities and not an actual physical being, I would say that God commands it because it is right."
The relevant characterization of God within DCT is that of an all-good, all-powerful, all-loving, omniscient creator of all that exists. So in so far as we are considering the merits of DCT, this is the conception we're working with. There are of course other ways individuals have tried to characterize God, it's just that these other characterizations would be orthogonal to an assessment of DCT. Now, that said, you also suggest here that you think God, as an idealized characterization of good and just qualities, nonetheless 'commands conduct because it is good.' This is a puzzling statement. Can 'idealized goodness' and 'idealized justice' actually command something, or must there be some being with intelligence, agency and intentionality in order to properly command conduct (or command anything for that matter?) If so, then it seems you'd have to either give up your claim that God is merely idealized qualities of goodness and justness OR alternatively give up the claim that God can 'command' conduct.
Finally, you say "In my opinion, the concepts of right and wrong exist outside of the framework of religion, and therefore this question might be considered outside of that framework as well."
In order to interpret your claim here fairly, I'd want to know a bit more specifically what you think on this point. What exactly do you take relationship between (i) religion; and (ii) rightness and wrongness to be?
Hi Adam, some good questions there.
ReplyDeleteYou said, "Your reasoning here relies on an implicit premise like the following: That the creator of things is also thereby the creator of the moral laws against which those things are evaluable. This implicit premise certainly isn't a truism and would have to be argued for, rather than taken for granted."
It may be that I didn't make the argument clear enough. To answer the point above, I would say that it is a truism by definition, much like the Ontological argument. I would say that moral laws are things in their own right, albeit without a physical form as is a soul, and when we talk about a being that creates ALL things, we must include those moral laws because if he did not create those laws then he would not be the creator of ALL things.
This is compatible with DCT, particularly the point "but equally as the creator of the moral laws against which human conduct is morally evaluable."
As a side point, I don't think that the Ontological argument stands up as proof of the existence of God, however, if such a divine being did exist then the Ontological argument would give us a good definition of that being.
On the second point, your charitable reading is pretty much what I was meaning and I can see why this point is orthogonal to the dilemma.
Would I be correct in saying that the problem/question posed by the first part of the dilemma could be summed up as this.....
'What came first, the Goodness or the God?'
Calum MacFadyen