It seems plausible enough that to have a belief is to be in a particular state of mind. But what kind of state of mind? What is the essential nature of belief? What sort of conditions must be met to qualify some state as a belief? What sort of conditions, when met, would suffice for qualifying some state as a belief? These questions are very hard, but it is not impossible to sketch some alternatives.
One suggestion is that beliefs might be like the "states of emergency" that governments declare. A state of emergency is a state that is supposed to play a particular kind of role in the activities of the institutions and citizens of a nation. In particular it is supposed to be a state in which institutions and citizens of the nation prepare themselves to adequately face real impending difficulties like natural disasters or wars. Of course, states of emergencies need not play this kind of role. Sometimes corrupt politicians create them artificially merely as opportunities to seize power, in which case there are no real impending difficulties for institutions and citizens of the nation to prepare themselves to adequately face (unless it is the corrupt politicians themselves, in which case, the state of emergency is undermining its own purpose).
Perhaps beliefs are also states that are supposed to do something as well. For instance, beliefs might be states that are supposed to be true. True beliefs might adequately prepare us to act so as to get what we want. Of course, some beliefs are not true, in which case, it would follow that some beliefs are not "doing their job" in this respect. In certain cases, this mishap might be due to bad luck, but in other cases the lack of truth might come as no surprise because the beliefs were not "fitting the evidence."
It can be interesting to think about what consequences this theory of belief has for religious belief. Occasionally, one hears the suggestion that religious belief should be belief that is insensitive to the evidence, so that it persists even when the evidence may not positively support it. Can we make sense of this suggestion if beliefs are, by their very nature, states of mind that are supposed to be true?
Benjamin, regarding your last question: I think I am inclined to answer negatively. It is (I think) very plausible to think that part of what it is for something to be a belief is for it to be the sort of thing that is correct iff true. To the extent that this is right as a picture of what a belief is, then (given that the best way to satisfy the norm governing correct belief is to believe in accordance with evidence), it must be mistaken to suppose that something that 'ought' to be held on the basis of something other than evidence--and which should be insensitive to evidence--is a 'belief.' It sounds to me that whatever state/attitude is held in such a way that it 'should be insensitive' to the evidence, that state/attitude is simply not a belief.
ReplyDeleteHi jadamcarter,
ReplyDeleteOne complicating factor worth thinking about: there are any number of "oughts" wandering around here. So someone might claim that although this state (religious belief) is a state that "ought" (in one sense, e.g. qua belief) to be held on the basis of evidence, it is also a state that "ought" (in another sense, e.g. qua religious belief) to be held on the basis of something else. For example, this kind situation might arise if it is possible to play a game that involves playing another (embedded) game very badly. In this case, one appears to be governed by opposing "obligations" or rules with respect to the two different games one is playing.