Normativity and Intentionality

Intentional states are states of mind that are about entities in the world, whether those entities be objects, properties, kinds, etc.  Related to the fact that these states are about entities, is the fact that intentional states (at least typically) have contents with truth conditions.  These contents are true or false depending on the features of the entities that the intentional states are about.  The paradigm of intentional states is, perhaps, belief.  However, intentional states include perceptual experiences, desires, hopes, memories, etc.

One thesis about intentional states that is of interest to philosophers of mind is the thesis (T) that, qua intentional states, they have normative essential natures.  This thesis could be clarified in a number of ways, but one way of thinking about it is that part of what it is to qualify as an intentional state is to be subject to certain kinds of norms.  One might think, for instance, that what makes something a belief with a particular content is the rational role that this something has.  The rational role is a matter of what other intentional states it would (as a kind of premise) rationally support as well as what other intentional states would rationally support it (as a kind of conclusion).  You might think that states qualify as intentional partly by taking on a particular rational role.

(T) is more controversial than it might first appear.  Many people would be sympathetic to the idea that, for instance, a belief is subject to epistemic norms (of rationality) even in any possible circumstance.  However, part of what is at issue is whether these norms apply to a belief because it is a belief, or whether a belief is a belief because the norms apply to it.  This kind of question is not settled even by conceding that there are epistemic norms applicable to beliefs that are even necessarily applicable.

However, I think one thing that might be relevant to whether (T) is true is the fact that, not only do we tend to think that norms apply to intentional states, we often think that intentional states are acquired, sustained, and revised because of applicable norms.  Common sense tells us that the norms have to get into the action in an explanatory sort of way.  Do they do so because the state is intentional?  If so, then it seems like we should think that intentionality is prior to the applicability of norms.  If not, then it would be more natural to think that the state is intentional because of the way the norms get into the action.  In the latter case, (T) definitely appears to be true.