This week's Friday Question comes from QUB student Carys Barry:
For this week's question, I will concentrate on what
Aristotle says about virtues. Aristotle sees virtues as a way of
reaching happiness ('eudaimonia'), not just happiness in the way that we
feel we experience it, but happiness in its 'full' sense. He says: 'T]he good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance
with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in
accordance with the best and most perfect kind.'
There are (at least) two ways to look at happiness: as it being a degree of happiness felt, or as something independent of feeling. Aristotle subscribes to the second, seeing that the view that happiness is objective. In contrast, other philosophers like Bentham advocate for a more subjective conception: 'Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry.'
Not only does Aristotle view happiness in a 'higher' way, he thinks that only certain people can ascertain this 'true' happiness. He says, 'happiness evidently also needs external good to be added, as we said, since we cannot , or cannot easily, do fine actions if we the resources… Further, deprivation of certain [externals]—for instance, good birth, good children, beauty—mars our blessedness.' This suggests that those without the resources of the rich may not obtain 'happiness', as they do not have the goods to fund their 'higher' happiness. However, I would say the exact opposite is true, happiness in its truest sense is completely unrelated to 'goods' or the 'virtues' one possesses. (Of course, I do think that there is on some hierarchy to kinds of happiness. Some happiness may be worse if it takes away the happiness of another or are immoral.)
Aristotle thinks 'eudaimonia is living a life of accomplishment via the exercise virtue.' My question is: Why does accomplishment via the exercise of virtue produce 'eudaimonia', when some people who are said to have done this and should have that 'higher' happiness, are in fact visibly less happy than those who have found solace in things that have nothing to do with accomplishment? And why does this make it a 'higher' happiness in any way that is genuinely valuable?
There are (at least) two ways to look at happiness: as it being a degree of happiness felt, or as something independent of feeling. Aristotle subscribes to the second, seeing that the view that happiness is objective. In contrast, other philosophers like Bentham advocate for a more subjective conception: 'Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry.'
Not only does Aristotle view happiness in a 'higher' way, he thinks that only certain people can ascertain this 'true' happiness. He says, 'happiness evidently also needs external good to be added, as we said, since we cannot , or cannot easily, do fine actions if we the resources… Further, deprivation of certain [externals]—for instance, good birth, good children, beauty—mars our blessedness.' This suggests that those without the resources of the rich may not obtain 'happiness', as they do not have the goods to fund their 'higher' happiness. However, I would say the exact opposite is true, happiness in its truest sense is completely unrelated to 'goods' or the 'virtues' one possesses. (Of course, I do think that there is on some hierarchy to kinds of happiness. Some happiness may be worse if it takes away the happiness of another or are immoral.)
Aristotle thinks 'eudaimonia is living a life of accomplishment via the exercise virtue.' My question is: Why does accomplishment via the exercise of virtue produce 'eudaimonia', when some people who are said to have done this and should have that 'higher' happiness, are in fact visibly less happy than those who have found solace in things that have nothing to do with accomplishment? And why does this make it a 'higher' happiness in any way that is genuinely valuable?
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