It is widely accepted that kinds have essences. For instance, it is an essential feature of the kind water that samples of that kind are largely composed of H2O. Something couldn't be water unless it were thus composed. Plausibly, it is an essential feature of the kind human being that instances of that kind contain DNA molecules. Something couldn't be a human being unless it had DNA molecules.
The way that we look for essences of kinds seems to be by seeking out what principally explains the characteristic superficial features of the kind in question. Arguably, it is even knowable a priori that the essences of kinds are individuated by whatever principally explains the characteristic superficial features of the kind. (Characteristic superficial features are the features that we ordinarily use to recognize instances of the kind in question.) This a priori knowledge would explain how we can know about the essences of kinds by engaging in empirical inquiry.
It is an interesting question whether this same approach to essences of kinds can apply to particulars. I think it is unlikely. Consider that we the superficial feature characteristic of a particular rock might be its distinctive (purple) color. What principally explains this feature might be that somebody painted the rock this color. However, I don't think this is a particularly good reason for thinking that having been painted is an essential feature of the particular rock in question. On this basis, I'm inclined to think that the story of essences for particulars has to be different than the story for kinds. Does that sound plausible?
No comments:
Post a Comment