Some philosophers of religion defend a version of the Evidential Argument from Evil known as the Direct Argument. The argument goes as follows:
(1) If there were a God, there would be no gratuitous evils (GEs)
(2) It is probable that at least one of the evils in our world is a GE.
(3) Therefore: probably, there is no God.
Firstly, regarding GEs: A given evil is a gratuitious evil (GE) if it is such that God would have no adequate justifying reason for permitting it (e.g. there is no sufficiently outweighing good that could not have been brought about without permitting a particular evil). [For more on gratuitous evil, see here].
In support of premise (2), William Rowe has suggested that mere reflection on some of the more heinous forms of evil in our world ought to convince us that it is probable that at least one of the evils in our world is a GE. As Murray and Rea suggest, "It seems simply obvious when we consider cases like [<Warning: distressing picture> a deer dying an agonizing, slow death in a forest fire] that there is no greater good to which we might appeal that could justify it." (Murray and Rea 2008: 167). Stephen Wykstra calls these kind of arguments "Noseeum Arguments": when considering certain cases like that of the deer, we look long and hard for some possible greater good, and yet we come up empty handed; put simply: we can't see any possible greater good, so it's probably not there.
As Murray and Rea point out, two conditions have to be met for a Noseeum inference to be a good one. Firstly, you have to be looking for the thing in question in the right place. Secondly, it must be the case that you would see the thing in question if it were really there. A Noseeum inference is a poor one if either of these conditions isn't met. After all, your inference that there is no milk in the refrigerator is no good if either (i) you would know milk if you saw it but looked in the wrong place for it (say, the garage), or, (ii) you looked in the right place for it (the fridge) but wouldn't know it if you saw it (say, you think milk looks like something much different than it does). Skeptical theists object to Noseeum arguments in defence of (2) of the Direct Argument, and this is because they think we are not well positioned when it comes to identifying assessing the reasons God might have for permitting evil. Their main contentions here are that, given the finitude of our human cognitive and moral faculties, it seems that there are many types of good with which we are not familiar, and further, that even if we were acquainted with the relevant goods, there is doubt that we would adequately comprehend the role these evils might play in bringing about those goods. (Murray & Rea 169.) Rowe responds to Skeptical Theists on this point by suggesting that, a problematic implication of their position is that we we must admit that no matter how much evil there might be in the world (and no matter how terrible it seems) we would never be in a position to accept (2): that it is probable that at least one of the evils in the world is a GE. Rowe also suggests that, in reply to the Skeptical Theists, it's not just that we looked and we can't see reasons that might justify God in permitting certain heinous evils (i.e. the deer's agonizing death), but that we can't even conceive of what such reasons would be. What do you think of Rowe's replies to the Skeptical Theist at this juncture? How might the Skeptical Theist reply?
Thanks for that post Adam.
ReplyDeleteI have at least two questions for clarification.
The first is this: what is the ontological status of evil? Is evil a thing or is it a relation amongst things, or is it our perception of things and their relations etc?
The second is this: theodicies often look for reasons for God's permitting evil to occur, but why should we think of God's having a reason to allow evil to occur? Why can't we hold that, given a sufficient account of the ontological status of evil, God cannot create a universe without what we call evil being present therein, and this whilst God is still omnipotent?
Best
Gav
Hi Gaven, regarding the first question: I take it that the ontological status of evil is akin to the ontological status of goodness. One way to think about goodness existing is in terms of manifesting properties. There is goodness in the world just in case at least one thing is good. And one thing is good just in case it has properties such that the evaluative property of 'being good' supervenes. The conditions under which this evaluative property would supervene are the subject matter of substantive moral theories. I would think mutatis mutandis for evil. Regarding the second question: if God couldn't create a (best possible) universe without evil, then that evil wouldn't be gratuitous, and so wouldn't be the sort that was at issue in the Direct Argument. The premise that is important in the Direct Argument is not that "it is probable that there is at least one evil in the world" but that " it is probable that there is at least one GE in the world."
ReplyDeleteHi Adam
ReplyDeleteThanks for that.
With regard to goodness, certainly if there is a thing that is good, then there is goodness in the world. But what does this tell us about the ontological status of goodness, that is, what is it to call a thing good?
I would be inclined to say that a thing is good insofar as it satisifies a desire, in which case goodness is that which all things desire. Given the latter then, the ontological status of the good is that it is an end for desire. On this conception of the good, I don't think the same can go mutatis mutandis for evil, since evil then would be what nothing desires and I think it is plausible (though perhaps controversial) to say that there is nothing that nothing desires!
Best
Gav
Hi Gaven, thanks for this; why not think of goodness (following the tradition of Brentano and A.C. Ewing) as the fitting object of a pro-attitude: or, more specifically, that for some object to be good is for it to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a “fitting” object of a pro-attitude. And mutatis mutandis for evil.
ReplyDeleteWell, could you draw out what you (or the authors you mention) mean by pro-attitude and thinking of good as the fitting object of such? How does it differ from my Aristotelian conception that good is the end of desire?
ReplyDeleteI take desire simply to be a need that a thing has, and this is relative to the type of thing it is. So I have a need for a certain tpe of environment, nourishment, and, I would argue, intellectual endeavour; what fulfills those needs I would say is good. Thus, the good is that which all desire and evil then is what nothing desires, which I submit is nothing.
So I guess that I would like to hear more about what you think of a pro-attitude, and especially what you think of the notion of an attitude, because the latter suggests to me a private inner space within which one comports oneself to the object of one's attitude, a notion whose commitments in the philosophy of mind I reject since it serves to create a fissure between mindedness and world.
Best
Gav