In our everyday explanations of someone's behavior, we often make reference to the person's beliefs and desires. We say that he went to the movies because he believed that he was meeting his friends or because he wanted to see an action flick. These explanations make it seem as if beliefs and desires are states of a person's mind that drive them towards engaging in certain kinds of activities.
One of the odd (and intriguing) features about beliefs and desires, however, is that having them seems to be partly a matter of having certain relational properties. For instance, a person's believing that Obama is the president of the US depends on their standing in the right kind of relationship to Obama. This is not a relationship that Julius Caesar stood in with respect to Obama; Julius Caesar could not have beliefs about Obama in the way that we can.
However, once we realize that having beliefs and desires involves having these relational properties, it is not clear why they should be important in explaining behavior. Relational properties are, in many instances, not very interesting for these kinds of explanatory purposes. For instance, it can appear bizarre, upon reflection, why standing in certain relations with the stars should make any difference to a person's earthly behavior, activities, encounters, situations, etc. That's at least part of what's strange about the suggestions of astrologists.
Consequently, there is a serious question as to whether beliefs and desires are themselves explanatory, or, for instance, whether having beliefs and desires merely entails that one is in other states that explain behavior. Thoughts?
Hi Ben
ReplyDeleteThanks for that interesting post. Can I ask, do you think that say having a belief that x is standing in a certain relation to a state of affairs signified by x? If so, do you think that the latter type of belief is different from the type of belief that might motivate an action, for example, a belief that I might meet my friends at the cinema?
Best
Gav
Hi Gaven,
DeleteI'm not sure what states of affairs are here. If we're talking about possible states of affairs (or more simply put, possibilities), then it seems pretty harmless to say that having a belief at least involves standing in a fairly interesting relation to the possible states of affairs in which the belief is true. However, I don't want to say that having a belief that p involves standing in a certain relation to the p-state of affairs if the latter is meant to imply that p is true. (Beliefs aren't factive.)
I guess I'm not yet seeing any motivation for thinking that there are two types of beliefs (unless maybe the types are mere belief and knowledge).
Can you say a bit more about what you had in mind?
Cheers,
Ben
Well, I was thinking of the following. Say we have a state of affairs describable in the following terms: the cat is on the mat. Now, let's say that it is that state of affairs, the cat's being on the mat, that is the content of my belief that p (so p signifies the cat's being on the mat). Is having a belief that p a case of standing in a relation to p, to the cat's being on the mat, such that it is that state of affairs that contributes to the forming of that belief? (do you mean to deny the latter when you say that beliefs aren't factive?).
DeleteIn any case, I suppose I am trying to motivate a distinction between beliefs that are formed by our direct engagement with states of affairs, e.g. the cat's being on the mat going to form my belief that the cat is on the mat, from a belief about some possibility, since a belief about a possibility does not entail standing in a relation to some state of affairs.
Best
Gav
Hi Ben,
ReplyDeletePerhaps the difference between these types of relations is a causal one.
I can stand in the relation in believing of Obama that he is the president of the US because the existence of (Obama, the presidency and the US itself) are the cause of my belief. Julius Caesar could not have stood in this relation because there was no (Obama or presidency of the US) that could cause him to stand in it.
My belief that going to cinema allows me to watch the latest action flick and my desire to see it cause me to go to the cinema. In the course of doing so the relation of the distance between myself and the moon will change, however, the difference is that this is not a causal relation.
Perhaps what makes beliefs and desires explanatory is that they are causal relations, whereas the other relations are non-causal...
Best,
Adrian